The $300 billion question: Can Antalya close the climate gap?
Adaptation needs in developing countries are projected to reach about $305 billion a year by 2035, while international public adaptation finance stood at only $28 billion to $32 billion in 2024. COP31 must turn pledges into funded plans with clear accountability
Adaptation needs alone exceed the entire $300 billion finance goal, and fossil fuel language is being diluted as ministers arrive. Both gaps can be closed with decisions, not declarations.
The Nutshell
- The COP31 negotiations face a widening gap between climate-finance pledges and developing countries’ needs.
- Governments must provide clearer timelines and accountability for the transition away from fossil fuels.
- Adaptation finance needs far exceed current public funding, with grants and access central to the dispute.
- Bangladesh is urging vulnerable countries to receive more grants, debt relief and support for a just energy transition.
The science is blunt as COP31 enters its decisive days. The UN has warned that the world is on course to overshoot 1.5°C, and the latest Global Carbon Budget puts the remaining allowance at 150 billion tonnes of CO2, less than four years of emissions at current rates. Delegates in Antalya must turn that warning into decisions governments can be held to.
The newest emissions data shows why. The Global Carbon Project projects fossil CO2 emissions to fall 0.4% this year, to 38.2 billion tonnes, but attributes much of the dip to the energy shock from the Iran conflict. Land-use emissions are rising, so total CO2 is projected to reach a record 43.3 billion tonnes. A system that moves through shocks rather than design is the expensive way to transition, especially for anyone allocating capital. The first test in Antalya is therefore what governments are prepared to say about fossil fuels.
A decision started, never resolved
Three years ago in Dubai, governments recognised for the first time the need to transition away from fossil fuels. The COP30 presidency in Brazil followed with a voluntary roadmap. In Antalya, the first draft of the cover decision, released on Monday, calls for accelerated action to phase out fossil fuels. Yet critics such as 350.org note that it welcomes the roadmaps without committing to carry them forward, and India has said it will not support a phase-out roadmap. A commitment that began as a decision risks being handled as a courtesy.
That ambiguity matters beyond diplomacy. Energy companies, the largest direct stakeholders, can plan for a managed decline in demand, a faster one or a slower one, but they cannot price a market whose rules shift with each presidency. Boards need credible signals because stranded-asset risk, financing costs and licence to operate all depend on them. A clear sequence of national plans, near-term targets and verification serves incumbents better than vague text that moves risk onto their balance sheets.
Electrification offers a more constructive route, and it is the bridge to the money question. The COP31 presidency’s “35 by 35” pledge aims for electricity to supply 35% of final energy demand by 2035, up from roughly 23% today. This year’s oil shock supplies the security argument, since electrified economies are less exposed to supply disruption. But the African Group warns that targets without the means of delivery are unfunded mandates, and the EU and campaigners want the power to be clean. Both objections lead straight to finance.
Finance: promises still short of the need
The arithmetic is stark. The draft cites UNEP’s 2026 Adaptation Gap Report, which puts developing countries’ adaptation needs at about $305 billion a year by 2035. International public adaptation finance stood at $28 billion to $32 billion in 2024. Even the draft’s proposal to triple adaptation finance to at least $120 billion a year by 2035 would cover no more than 29% of estimated needs.
The headline target is no safer. The Baku goal commits developed countries to lead the mobilisation of at least $300 billion a year by 2035, within a broader ambition of $1.3 trillion from all sources. An assessment highlighted at COP31 suggests that, on current trends, the broader target could be missed by $840 billion a year. A senior EU official has also warned of “no political will” for extra pledges in Antalya.
That is the $300 billion question. Even if the goal is met in full, it must cover mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage together, while adaptation needs alone stand at about $305 billion. The goal can be achieved on paper and the gap can still stay open. The draft tries to respond with a baseline for tripling adaptation finance using a grant-equivalent method, a roadmap with milestones, and pledges to the Adaptation Fund and the loss and damage fund by the end of 2027.
Who pays is the structural dispute. Developing countries want the finance work programme anchored in developed countries’ obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, while the EU and others want all sources counted. Both positions have logic. The practical resolution is to separate the layers: a defined public, grant-based core that is owed and measured, with a clear architecture to mobilise private capital on top. Private capital will not fill a hole that public money has not defined. Money, however, is only as credible as the markets and rules that channel it.
Market integrity is a climate issue
Carbon markets sit in a quieter corner of the negotiations, but they shape how finance and ambition are counted. Weak integrity rules under Article 6 turn credits into reputational liabilities for buyers. The push to restrict “unilateral climate trade measures” also puts instruments such as the EU carbon border levy in play. Firms should treat these as strategic exposures, not technical footnotes. Integrity matters just as much to the people at the receiving end, which is where the just transition comes in.
Just transition and gender: where delivery shows
The Just Transition Mechanism agreed in Belém is the test of whether the regime can turn commitments into institutions. Its mandate, financing role and timeline are still unsettled. The Belém Gender Action Plan belongs in the same conversation, because gender-responsive design determines whether adaptation finance reaches households and whether transition programmes reach workers outside the formal sector. A plan is only as strong as its resourcing across the other decisions. Few countries show what is at stake better than Bangladesh.
What Bangladesh shows: a voice for the vulnerable
Bangladesh makes the case in concrete form. It contributes about 0.05% of global greenhouse gas emissions, has invested in adaptation for decades and cut cyclone mortality through early warning, yet still faces rising seas, floods and salinity. Its National Adaptation Plan to 2050 is costed at about $230 billion.
In Antalya, Dhaka is positioning itself as a leading voice for climate-vulnerable and least developed countries, coordinating with the LDC Group, the Climate Vulnerable Forum and the V20. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman told the high-level session that vulnerable countries need grants, not more loans that add to their debt. He proposed five measures: at least 50% of international climate finance for adaptation; debt relief, including climate-resilient debt clauses and debt-for-climate swaps; fair access to climate technology; a faster renewable transition through affordable finance; and a Belém-Antalya Action Mechanism for a just energy transition. Dhaka also seeks a tripling of adaptation finance, simpler access to loss and damage grants, and clarity on how developed countries will lead the $300 billion goal.
The grants-versus-loans point is backed by data. Change Initiative’s 2025 Climate Debt Risk Index found that Bangladesh received $2.70 in climate loans for every $1 in grants, and a separate study found that roughly nine-tenths of the energy-sector climate finance it examined came as loans. Graduation from least developed country status, due this month, sharpens the risk because concessional access can narrow just as exposure peaks.
The lesson extends beyond Bangladesh. A country’s climate vulnerability is not captured by its income per capita, and finance built on income thresholds will keep misallocating support. Basing eligibility on risk rather than income is a better predictor of need and a better basis for accountability.
What Antalya must deliver
What Antalya must deliver Ministers now have days, not weeks, and the pattern across every issue is the same: ambition is stated, while sequence, money and accountability are left open. Three tests will show whether Antalya delivers.
First, does the text turn the Dubai commitment into a sequence with dates and reporting, or merely reaffirm it? Second, does adaptation finance gain a baseline that counts grants properly, a roadmap with milestones and a grant-based core? Third, does the Just Transition Mechanism leave Antalya with a mandate and a budget?
The cost of failure will not fall evenly. It will fall first on vulnerable economies such as Bangladesh, then on energy companies and investors who need predictable rules to plan. Governments, industry and finance share an interest in finishing what was begun in Dubai and promised in Belém.
Shaila Shahid is Climate Resilience and DRR Specialist, Miyamoto international, USA, and Chair, GenderCC board, a global network working for gender equality and climate justice based in Berlin, Germany.