Shadows of a New Yalta: Three emperors in Shenzhen and the fate of a watching world
This highly anticipated three-way meeting between Xi, Trump, and Putin could shift power away from the US towards a more contested world order. For Bangladesh, a lot depends on how it balances ties with China, the US, and India
The world watches as US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin prepare to hold the first-ever trilateral summit in Shenzhen, China, on Thursday, November 19, 2026 – bringing together the leaders of the world’s three largest nuclear powers.
This meeting takes place against a backdrop where Trump’s transactional and unilateral foreign policies have frequently strained traditional US alliances in Europe, the Middle East, and Australasia, inadvertently elevating the geopolitical standing of Xi and Putin. Across the Indo-Pacific, aggressive tariff regimes and shifting security priorities have similarly tested relations with long-standing partners like Australia, Japan, and South Korea.
What could this summit mean for contemporary global geopolitics and geo-economics? It represents an intersection of three distinct leadership archetypes: a US president who relies on personal, high-profile deal-making; a confident leader projecting China as a rising superpower operating on its own terms; and a Russian leader attempting to reclaim great-power status from the ruins of the former Soviet Union.
It represents an intersection of three distinct leadership archetypes: a US president who relies on personal, high-profile deal-making; a confident leader projecting China as a rising superpower operating on its own terms; and a Russian leader attempting to reclaim great-power status from the ruins of the former Soviet Union
Each figure approaches the table with contrasting styles and divergent expectations. While Trump seeks a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough on nuclear non-proliferation and de-escalation in Iran, he does so while commanding the world’s largest economy and military, yet facing deep scepticism from allies fatigued by his trade strategies. Xi Jinping – who holds significant trade and energy leverage over both Moscow and Tehran – projects quiet confidence, eager to shape great-power dynamics on domestic turf without binding himself to Western-led rules, strict nuclear limits, or European entanglements.
Putin – an equally megalomaniacal leader like Trump – still wishes to maintain a voice in global geopolitics and geoeconomics, especially given his long-term alliances in the Middle East and the context of the US’s ill-conceived war of choice with Iran. How, then, do these competing dynamics interact at the summit, and how do they affect the rest of the world?
In the shadow of the Dragon and the Bear: A diminished Washington at the Shenzhen table
Despite claims by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Vice President JD Vance, and Trump himself that his geopolitical and geo-economic strategies have helped end allied “free-riding” – by upending decades of unconditional US security guarantees that allowed wealthy allies in Europe and Asia to underinvest in their own defence while running large trade surpluses with the United States, and by confronting Beijing’s trade practices directly through sweeping tariffs and export controls before negotiating temporary truces like the Busan framework agreement – critics argue these policies have backfired.
While Trump has prioritized US industrial resilience and bilateral reciprocity to counter China’s power over multilateral agreements that administration officials contend constrain American economic growth, his approach has fractured transatlantic cohesion by questioning mutual defence commitments, demanding NATO allies raise defence spending to 5% of GDP, and imposing steep tariffs on European goods.
Furthermore, Trump’s unpredictability and pursuit of ongoing regional conflicts – particularly a war with Iran lacking a clearly defined endgame or broader geopolitical strategy, while following the adventurous military paths of accused war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu – have led Gulf partners to hedge their bets. Rather than relying exclusively on Washington for security, Middle Eastern states are now increasingly pursuing strategic autonomy and deepening their economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing and Moscow.
Furthermore, Trump’s upcoming historic trilateral summit with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin comes at a moment when his domestic political standing – despite his bravado – is at its weakest. Following a Democratic “blue tsunami” in the 2026 US midterm elections, Trump enters the talks diminished in leverage for the remainder of his term. The electoral backlash unfolded against the backdrop of the US conflict with Iran – a geopolitical gamble that has strained the American economy, driven up gas prices, and disrupted the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Trump himself has publicly attributed the major Republican losses to voter frustration over the Iran conflict and rising fuel costs. Meanwhile, the incoming Democratic congressional majorities have signalled plans to impose stricter oversight on his foreign policy and sanctions decisions.
Ironically, at the exact moment he is most constrained at home by a hostile Congress and war-weary voters, Trump is seeking a high-profile foreign policy breakthrough – such as initiating nuclear arms talks or easing Middle East tensions – to project strength and shift political momentum. Yet he enters these negotiations from a weakened geopolitical and geo-economic position.
While both Washington and Moscow arrive burdened by the costly military and economic toll of prolonged regional wars, Xi Jinping has avoided direct military entanglement, positioning Beijing as a stable global actor and a crucial diplomatic broker. Despite China’s ongoing maritime assertiveness – which continues to undermine its own narrative of peaceful coexistence and create uneasy strategic dynamics – several shifts in US foreign policy under President Donald Trump have strained traditional alliances with ASEAN countries.
In light of new frictions between Washington and its Asian partners, particularly over tariffs and security-related matters with South Korea and Japan, these shifts have created a diplomatic opening for Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. Ironically, even if only theoretically, this gives President Xi Jinping unexpected room to promote his vision of a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” – a modern framing of the ancient Tianxia (“All Under Heaven”) philosophy – through China’s Belt and Road, Maritime Silk Road, and Digital Silk Road initiatives. This outreach spans the broader Asia-Pacific, a region rebranded as the “Indo-Pacific” through US design and Japanese acquiescence under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Rising anti-Indian sentiment among the Bangladeshi populace following the July 2024 Revolution – driven by anger over India’s role in sustaining the ousted regime of Sheikh Hasina – alongside broader regional pushback against perceived Indian hegemony in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan, has given China new strategic footholds across the subcontinent
Meanwhile, in South Asia, rising anti-Indian sentiment among the Bangladeshi populace following the July 2024 Revolution – driven by anger over India’s role in sustaining the ousted regime of Sheikh Hasina – alongside broader regional pushback against perceived Indian hegemony in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan, has given China new strategic footholds across the subcontinent.
While Donald Trump’s weakening domestic position has given Vladimir Putin some strategic leeway to seek US assistance in extricating Russia from its quagmire in Ukraine during the upcoming Shenzhen summit, it is Xi Jinping who holds the most advantageous position. China has acquired the same economic, military, and cultural wherewithal that once propelled Great Britain – and later the United States – to systemic superpower status. At the same time, Trump’s short-sighted, transactional foreign policies risk accelerating a US retreat from its longstanding role as primus inter pares (“first among equals”), allowing Xi to highlight the emergence of a Pax Sinica order.
Several developments leading into the November 2026 Shenzhen summit place Beijing in this uniquely advantageous diplomatic position, such as (a) diplomatic centrality: hosting the first-ever trilateral summit between Xi Jinping, Donald Trump, and Vladimir Putin allows China to position itself as an indispensable global power broker; (b) asymmetric leverage over Russia: protracted conflict in Ukraine and Western economic isolation have left Russia heavily reliant on China for energy exports and high-tech industrial components.
Although Putin seeks to use the trilateral format to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, Moscow enters the talks as the clear junior partner in its “no-limits” relationship with Beijing, and (c) US domestic constraints and transnationalism, following Republican losses in both houses of Congress during the 2026 midterm elections, Xi is already looking past the current US administration while conceding as little ground as possible. Furthermore, Trump’s willingness to strike bilateral deals – such as waiving sanctions for a Russian diesel agreement or pursuing a trade truce with Beijing – reinforces the perception of a transactional approach that sidelines traditional multilateral frameworks.
Ultimately, the Shenzhen summit underscores a clear shift away from unipolar US dominance toward a contested, multipolar environment in which Xi Jinping can project diplomatic centrality. At the same time, persistent US military superiority, deep-seated mutual distrust among Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, and emerging technology-security coalitions suggest that the new international order is defined more by fragmented competition than by a consolidated Pax Sinica – even as the United States increasingly struggles to maintain its status as primus inter pares.
Three thrones in Shenzhen, one tightrope for Dhaka
For Bangladesh – which is not an APEC member – the summit acts as an indirect barometer for its “Bangladesh First” hedging strategy under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman. As Dhaka actively diversifies away from historical reliance on India while balancing deep Chinese economic ties against Western and Japanese strategic partnerships, Shenzhen offers both critical breathing room and subtle geopolitical risks.
While expectations for a comprehensive trade breakthrough between Trump and Xi in Shenzhen are low, both sides are weighing an extension of their current trade truce ahead of the December G20 summit. Any stabilization in US-China economic ties reduces immediate pressure on Dhaka to pick sides, allowing Bangladesh to continue courting US energy and tech investments alongside Chinese industrial and port projects. However, given that relations between Beijing and Tokyo are strained following Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan, with China refusing a bilateral meeting in Shenzhen, Dhaka, which has recently deepened ties with both powers – signing a Free Trade Agreement and strategic partnership with Japan in October 2026 while launching a “2+2” dialogue and defence cooperation with China – will need to carefully insulate its bilateral infrastructure projects (such as Chinese-backed port modernization and Japanese-backed rail and industrial zones) from regional diplomatic blowback.
Shamsul Khan is a Bangladeshi-born retired Australian academic and scholar of international affairs based in Adelaide. Before migrating to Australia, he taught in the Department of International Relations at the University of Dhaka.